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ARTICLE
AN ENQUIRY INTO SUFI METAPHYSICS1
Ezgi Ulusoy Aranyosi
The fact that Sufi metaphysics is usually taken to be merely the writings of
Islamic philosophers, like Ibn al-’Arabi, seems to underestimate the
philosophical indications of literary texts in the Sufi tradition. When Sufi
literary texts are examined for philosophical content, that content is sought
within and through the traditional Sufist approach. However, there appears
to be a lack of correspondence between the traditional approach on the
main conceptions (of God, of the universe, etc.) in Sufism and what literary
texts can offer regarding those, when some literary texts are to be examined
in a way in which an underlying philosophical system can be extracted
from them. In this article, I present a brief analysis ofTheConference of the
Birds by Farid ud-DinAttar, one of the most significant works focusing on
God and written in Sufi tradition. I suggest an alternative framework for
Sufi metaphysics, which overlaps with the metaphysical connotations of
The Conference of the Birds, via some Spinozistic ideas on God and on
God’s relationship to the rest of the universe. Since The Conference of the
Birds represents a metaphysical doctrine that is apart from the traditional
approach, I argue that we are not justified in thinking that Sufi
metaphysics is only what Islamic philosophers have so far offered us.
KEYWORDS: Sufi metaphysics; Ibn al-’Arabi; pantheism; Spinozist
ontology; Farid ud-Din Attar
WHY AND HOW TO INQUIRE INTO SUFI METAPHYSICS
The fact that Sufi metaphysics is usually taken to be merely writings of
Islamic philosophers, like Ibn al-’Arabi, seems to underestimate the philo-
sophical implications of literary texts in the Sufi tradition. When Sufi
literary texts are examined for philosophical content, that content is sought
within and through the traditional Sufist approach. However, there appears
to be a lack of correspondence between the traditional approach to the main
1I am grateful to Sandrine Berges, Lars Vinx, Ulrich Steinworth and William Coker for their
comments on this article. I am very much indebted to István Aranyosi for his care and diligence
in reading the drafts that made the final version possible. I would like to thank John Rogers for
his helpful editorial suggestions. I would also like to acknowledge my profound gratitude to
Hilmi Yavuz for the fruitful discussions that brought this thesis to its best.
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conceptions (of God, of the universe, etc.) in Sufism and what literary texts
can offer regarding those, when some literary texts are to be examined in a
way in which an underlying philosophical system can be extracted from
them. My aim in this article is to reinterpret Sufi metaphysics, via some
Spinozistic ideas on God and on God’s relationship to the rest of the
universe. This approach would provide a new explanatory framework for
the mismatches between the traditional approach, like that of Ibn
al-’Arabi’s, and The Conference of the Birds by Farid ud-Din Attar, one
of the most significant works focusing on God and written in Sufi tradition.
My project will proceed in three stages: I will first set forth the traditional
approach to Sufi metaphysics. Second, I aim to come up with an analysis of
The Conference of the Birds, emphasising its metaphysical connotations.
Then, I will present a reading of the relevant aspects of Spinoza’s philo-
sophy, which focuses on the debate on pantheism. I will show that this
reading captures some metaphysical assumptions that match the plausible
alternative interpretation of the above-mentioned literary text. I will suggest
that The Conference of the Birds, therefore, represents a metaphysical doc-
trine that is separate from the traditional approach, i.e. that this inter-
pretation reveals a different viewpoint on the metaphysics of Sufism and of
Islamic mysticism, within the same tradition. This suggested explanatory
framework will focus on the idea of God as a divine mind, on the
background of some Spinozistic ideas. By doing so, I aim to show that we
are not justified in thinking that Sufi metaphysics is only what Islamic
philosophers have so far offered us.
1. INTRODUCTION
Sufism is said to be the religious philosophy of Islam from a broad point of
view.2 Definitions of Sufism, from metaphorical descriptions to theoretical
formulations, vary from source to source.3 What is common to all these
definitions seems to be that Sufism is a religious attitude with philosophical
connotations. The reason why I replace ‘philosophy’ with ‘attitude’ is
because attitude covers more of what can be extracted from Sufism, since the
diversity among philosophical tendencies of different groups4 in the one and
the same Sufi tradition would not allow us to attribute the same philo-
sophical scope to all Sufis. However, all Sufis have the attitude in common.
This attitude of the Sufi can be put in common terms of complete devotion
2Reynold A. Nicholson, The Mystics of Islam (England: Arkana, 1989) 1.
3For example, Martin Lings defines Sufism as ‘the vocation and the discipline and the science of
plunging into the ebb of one of these waves and being drawn back with it to its Eternal and
Infinite Source’; see Lings, What is Sufism? (London: Unwin Hyman Limited, 1981) 11.
Another distinguished scholar, Titus Burckhardt, takes Sufism to be the esoteric or inward
aspect of Islam; see Burckhardt, Introduction to Sufism (Glasgow: Thorsons, 1995) 15.
4See footnotes 4 and 5 for the detailed explanation for the diversity among groups.
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to self-contemplation, literary productivity and profound interest in
religion. The general doctrine of Sufism, with certain philosophical assump-
tions, rules out diversities in philosophical beliefs of various groups.
Nevertheless, usually, not the attitude, but the general doctrine of Sufism is
regarded as the common ground for Sufis’ literary works and philosophical
writings.
There are two problems that occur with this sort of one-way generalist
approach. The first problem is that there are diverse groups5 within Sufism,
as it is acknowledged by some scholars.6 The subtle differences among the
understandings of these groups create a substantial difference in their
literary tradition, if analysed sufficiently closely. Given the multiplicity in
understanding within Sufism, the common one-to-one association between a
literary work of a certain understanding in Sufism and the Sufi doctrine in
general comes out as weak, even unjustified. Since a literary work in Sufism,
then, turns out to be a context-specific piece of work, it cannot be fully
examined by appeal to the Sufi doctrine in general. The second problem is
the problem of oversimplification in textual analysis. This oversimplification
springs from the presupposition that literary works in Sufi tradition are
to unfold predominantly through various elements7 of Sufi doctrine in
general. A one-way analysis as such eventually turns into a task of fitting the
literary piece into a doctrinal outfit. In textual analysis, then, a pre-existing
scheme8 that is formed by such elements excludes any other plausible
interpretation.
However, Sufi literature is an exemplary phenomenon concerning how
philosophy could be embodied in poetry and prose, as for Sufis, writing
5There are two levels of diversity among these groups: (1) Diversity according to religious
practices. This level of diversity will not concern our discussion, as we focus on written pieces of
systematic work that are acknowledged by the greatest scholars of Islamic studies rather than
the doctrines of tariqats that are orally transmitted most of the time and designed mainly for
religious practice. This diversity, therefore, is not to be considered as a determining factor in our
selection of texts to be focused on. (2) Diversity according to the domain in which the Sufi
expresses himself. This domain is either philosophy or poetry/prose that embodies a philo-
sophical structure. As the former level of diversity is not applicable to our examination
regarding the inefficiency of its divisive criterion for what we desire to inquire about, we take the
second level of diversity to be our main line of division.
6For example, Idries Shah mentions four orders (the Chisti order, the Qadiri order, the
Suhrawardi order and the Naqshbandi order) in Sufi tradition; see The Way of Sufi (London:
Penguin Compass, 1990) 125. His classification depends on how Sufis in these groups exhibited
differences concerning their exercise of religion. In the same way, Shaykh Fadhlalla Haeri, in
The Elements of Sufism (Shaftesbury: Element Books, 1990) 20, adds more orders to these ones:
the Rıfa’ı order, the Shadili order, the Mevlavi order, the Bektashi order, the Ni’amatullah
order, the Tıjani order and the Jarrahi order.
7These elements come from the theoretical writings in Sufi tradition and shape what we call the
Sufi doctrine in general.
8This pre-existing scheme I shall call ‘the traditional approach’, since it consists of main
theoretical elements and therefore represents the theoretical aspect of Sufi doctrine in general.
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literary texts was a way of reflecting upon their ideas and beliefs.9 For a
literature of this kind, it looks prejudicial to bind down our textual analysis
to a particular, traditional approach. At this point, then, a shift regarding
our orientation for textual analysis is called for. In this project, I suggest to
move from one of the most famous works of Sufi poetry, The Conference of
the Birds by Attar, to a new doctrinal construction that is built upon what, if
anything, philosophical can be extracted from the literary work itself.
2. SUFI METAPHYSICS BY PHILOSOPHERS OF ISLAM
The most sensible step to take first seems to be elaborating on what we bring
an alternative to. As a leading figure in Sufism, Ibn al-’Arabi10 is considered
as the father of the theoretical aspect of Sufi metaphysics. His writings
comprise most of what we can trace back as the source of Sufi metaphysics,
even though there are scholars throughout the history who suggested
alternative theories.11 I will focus on Ibn al-’Arabi, since his theory has been
the orthodox view in Sufi tradition. I will try to give a clear picture of Ibn al-
’Arabi’s theory of Sufi metaphysics.
Osman Yahia estimates that Ibn al-’Arabi wrote 700 books, treatises and
collections of poetry, out of which there are 400 that we have access to, as of
today.12,13 In his work Futûhât al-makkiyya, which consists of 17,000
9Another reason behind the fact that Sufi literature embodies a highly philosophical content
may have something to do with the relationship between religion and literature, and its appeal
to theory and to practice in Sufi tradition. Religion was prima facie considered to be better
grasped as a practice than as a theory. Poetry, then, could satisfy this aspect of religion with its
contemplative effect and yet could carry the theoretical aspect of religion, for it aims to
emphasise certain elements of their belief systems.
10With his full nameMuhyi ad-DinMuhammad bin Ali al-Hatimi at-Tai Ibn al-’Arabi, 1165–1240,
aMuslim Sufi. He is one of the great Sufis of theMiddle Ages (Shah 1990, p. 83).His writings have a
profound effect on Sufi tradition, both in literary and philosophical aspects. He is considered one of
the greatest Islamic metaphysical thinkers. His works include al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya [the Meccan
Revelations] in 37 volumes, containing a full exposition of his Sufi doctrine; Fusus al-Hikam, [Bezels
of Wisdom], a summary of the teachings of 28 prophets, from Adam to Muhammad.
11For example, Imam-e-RabbaniMujaddid Alf Sani ShaykhAhmad al-Farooqi Sirhindi (*1564–
1624) and Shah Waliullah Muhaddith Dehlavi (1703–1762) have different formulations of Sufi
metaphysics. The former scholar pointed inMaktoobat Rabbaniyah that God’s existence is greater
than the creation and is due to His essence. The latter in his books Lamahat and Sata’at elaborates
on Ibn al-’Arabi’s philosophy and asserts that Ibn al-’Arabi’s ‘God is all’ refers to the Universal
Soul. Dehlavi thinks that God is true reality and that He stands alone with this quality (oneness).
That is, Ibn al-’Arabi does not imply anything pantheistic or monistic.
12Seven hundred may seem a highly estimated number of written works by Ibn al-’Arabi,
however, it must be recognised that the collections of poetry, usually in the form of prayers, and
short treatise-like texts (for example, the books Kernel of the Kernel, 48 pages and Whoso
Knowth Himself, 27 pages) are also counted within this number. Unedited pieces of manuscripts,
maybe some of them constituting books, may allow such a number.
13Quoted by William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-‘Arabi’s Metaphysics of
Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) xi.
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pages,14 Ibn al-’Arabi discusses a wide range of topics. Above all, we are
interested in his ideas on the relationship between God and the world,
the structure of the cosmos, the unity of Being and the unity of existence.
The theoretical aspect of the work confirms it as the masterpiece of and the
guide to Sufi metaphysics. My main focus in this piece is the nature of the
unity of Being and of existence in Ibn al-’Arabi’s philosophy, as I specifically
elaborate upon these concepts, starting below.
Ibn al-’Arabi is taken to be the prime mover of the idea of wahdat
al-wujûd, which literally means, unity of creation, of being, of existence.15
The meaning of this idea has been controversial, since its prolific content
could give rise to as many interpretations as the number of readers. These
lexical references of the term wahdat al-wujûd stand as general signifiers for
Ibn al-’Arabi’s use of the term; however, when we focus on his use, we
realise that we have certain limitations in determining the sense of the term.
Chittick finds two senses, emerging out of three different translations, of the
term in Ibn al-’Arabi’s system: (a) Ibn al-’Arabi employs the term as a
general one for existence, to refer to the fact that existents share at least one
quality, being there in the cosmos. (b) Second, he believes that Ibn al-’Arabi
ascribes ‘Being’ to the term16 which refers to God as in Himself.17 Consi-
dering both uses of the term, the relationship between existence and Being
reveals the basic metaphysical foundations of Ibn al-’Arabi’s system. This
relationship is founded on the idea that existence, namely, the things that
exist – the whole cosmos – are spatial and temporal and Being provides the
possibility for things to exist, so things exist through Being,18 not vice versa.
Chittick’s and Burckhardt’s criticisms19,20 of scholars who are tempted to
interpret the unity of creation as a pantheistic belief 21 are fair enough, when
Ibn al-’Arabi’s formulation of Sufi metaphysics is taken into account. The
first point of criticism is by Burckhardt. He believes that ‘pantheism only
conceives of the relationship between the Divine Principle and things from
14Idem.
15Francis J. Steingass, A Learner’s Arabic-English Dictionary (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1989)
1192, 1201.
16The nuance between ‘Being’ and existence in Ibn al-’Arabi’s terminology is an interesting one.
The subtlety here is that Being is associated with characteristics superior to those existence
possesses, characteristics such as consciousness, perception and knowledge of the ontological
situation. Things, on the other hand, exist in various modes and existence is merely one of their




20Titus Burckhardt, Introduction to Sufism (Glasgow: Thorsons, 1995) 28–30.
21For example, Davis suggests in his introduction to The Conference of Birds a description of Ibn
al-’Arabi as ‘the Spanish Arab pantheist’; see Farid ud-Din Attar, [1177]. The Conference of the
Birds, translated by Afkham Darbandi and Dick Davis (London: Penguin Books, 1984) 12.
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the point of view of substantial or existential continuity, and this is an error
explicitly rejected by every traditional doctrine.’22 He continues:
If there were such a continuity by virtue of which God and the manifested
universe could be compared as a branch can be compared with the trunk
from which it sprang, then this continuity (or what amounts to the same
thing), the substance common to the two terms [branch and the trunk, the
manifested universe and God] would be either determined by some superior
principle which differentiated it or would itself be superior to the two terms
which it bound together and, in a sense, included: God would then not be
God.23
Burckhardt here considers this pantheistic principle of continuity as
leading us in two ways. (i) God and the manifested universe both existing in
regard of such a continuity would require a superior principle that
determines this continuity. This required superior principle would be
different than both. (ii) The second option would be that this continuity
would itself be superior both to the manifested universe and to God, which
would result in destruction of God’s superiority to all. Then, God would not
be God, indeed.
The second point of criticism is that it is a mistake to take the clay
analogy, which compares things to pots of differing form but all made of
clay – the famous example that is attributed to Advaita philosophy24 –
reversely. If the totality of material things, namely the unity of existence, is
thought to be prior to the essential unity of things, namely the unity of
Being, then there is a problem with the causality principle behind the
creation.25 The difference between the two senses of wahdat al-wujûd, unity
of existence and unity of Being, as we pointed out earlier, are confused in
this case. Because the clay analogy works with the clay itself and pots of
differing shapes that represent the totality of material things, this scheme of
the clay analogy can only explain the unity of existence. However, the
explananda do not include the Creator, the potter if put in terms of the clay
analogy. If the clay analogy is concerned merely with the totality of material
things as the unity of existence, then it cannot offer an explanation for God’s
unity – the unity of Being. Therefore, we are not entitled to shift the unity of
existence that is implied in the clay analogy to the unity of Being.
Burckhardt develops this criticism into another one that is directed to the
metaphysical hierarchy in Sufism. He says:
He recognizes innumerable levels of reality, the hierarchy of which is irre-
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principle [the ontological cause, independent of its effects] or that it ‘is’ its
principle although one cannot say of the principle that it is included in
its product. Thus all beings are God, but God is not all these beings (. . .).26
Because Ibn al-’Arabi’s scheme is irreversible in the sense that God is the
source that the cosmos emanates from, it is a logical mistake to speak of a
one-to-one match between the totality of existents in cosmos and God, the
Creator. God is greater than the creation itself and this is not due to a simple
sense of exclusion but to a huge difference in degree. Related to this point,
Chittick’s main criticism against taking Ibn al-’Arabi’s philosophy as
pantheistic is the following:
God in Himself is Being, and nonexistence has no relationship to Him. That
which sets ‘everything other than God’ apart from God is the admixture of
nonexistence. Things, entities, possible things, loci of manifestation, forms,
attributes, (. . .). The things possess certain modes of relative existence, that is
existence through the Other, who is God, the Necessary Being. (. . .) The
cosmos is He/not He. In the context of the philosophical terminology, the
basic issue can be phrased in the simple question: ‘If God is wujûd, are the
things also wujûd?’. The Shaykh [Ibn al-’Arabi] answers that God alone is
Being, and the ‘existence’ of the things is identical to that Being, though the
quiddities of the things as quiddities are not Being; in themselves the things are
nonexistent.27
When all these points of criticism are taken into account, there is no room
for monism or pantheism in Sufi metaphysics according to this traditional
approach.28
On the one hand, the label of pantheism is avoided with the pre-
supposition that materialistic monism is out of question when Quranic
values are considered; on the other hand, I believe, the question




28Panentheism, according to which the creation is in God but still it is not God (G.H.R
Parkinson, in Spinoza, B. [1677]. Ethics, edited and translated by G.H.R. Parkinson (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 22), is not excluded by some as an alternative. However,
according to the traditional approach, the creation with its qualities do belong to Not-He as
well (Chittick 1989, 7). Then, panentheism too – at its face value – is not applicable to Sufi
metaphysics.
29By pantheism, I mean the belief system in which God is regarded as identical to what there is.
30By materialistic monism, I mean the belief system in which there exists only one material
substance.
31I will get back to this question, when suggesting an alternative view to several conceptions in
Sufi metaphysics. I will suggest a different pantheistic reading to the Spinozistic conception of
God and of the universe.
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When pantheism spells out the motto ‘All is God’,32 the general tendency
is to take this statement at its face value as ‘God is identical to all material
existence’. The problem with this inference is that ‘all’ is taken to be the
material existence without further inquiry. We could as well, for all the
motto allows, think of ‘all’ in very different terms. All as both the spiritual33
and the material34 is a plausible option.35 Nevertheless, the plausible
materialistic monism as an option that comes along with pantheism places
an abyss between Sufism and pantheism per se. Given the metaphysical
hierarchy in systems like that of Ibn al-’Arabi’s and other Islamic
philsophers in the same tradition, this may come out as a fact. Another
question, though, perhaps one of vital importance for the discussion, is
whether there are any views other than the traditional approach, expressed
theoretically or embodied in literary texts, that may be open to different
constructions of Sufi metaphysics. I argue that there is. The next part of the
project is devoted to the exploration of this matter.
3. METAPHYSICAL CONNOTATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE
OF BIRDS BY ATTAR THE SUFIST
My plan in this section is to present what The Conference of the Birds as a
piece of Sufi literary work can offer philosophically. The metaphorical use of
the text is rich in content and complex in terms of the cross-references that
32‘All is God’ is known to be used during the revival of Spinozistic thought among German
romantics in nineteenth century. This motto had its original form in Greek at the time: ‘Hen kai
pan’ [One and all]. In Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn,
we see Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi quoting Lessing when Lessing says (to Jacobi) ‘I have come to
talk to you about my hen kai pan’ (Jacobi [1785], The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel
Allwill (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994) 187). This frequently used sentence
meant Spinozistic philosophy and pantheism in the same context. However, some, like
Toshimasa Yasukata in Lessing’s Philosophy of Religion and the German Enlightenment (April
2003, Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs) pp. 117–140, argue that Lessing’s thought on
Spinoza was more in the direction of panentheism, yet Lessing’s relation to pantheism remains
open to discussion.
33By spiritual, I mean that of non-material.
34By material, I mean that of pertaining to the physical sciences. For this way of defining the
‘material’, see Daniel Stoljar, ‘Physicalism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (February
2001, Available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism).
35Here, what I suggest does not have much to do with panentheism (for Parkinson’s definition,
see footnote 27) in which God is taken to be more than the creation. ‘All with both the spiritual
and the material content’ will not eventually offer a difference in degree but a difference in kind
among these contents. I will expand this suggestion in what will follow. Right now, I merely aim
to show that the reason Sufism tends to exclude pantheism is pantheism’s being taken to be
some kind of materialistic monism. I will rule out this exclusion by putting forward a difference
between the two. Then, I will present a reading of pantheistic terms that embraces certain
principles of Sufism and nevertheless argues for ‘All is God.’
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end up creating a whole system in which God, the universe and the man
seem to be reidentified. I will try to sketch a brief analysis36 to uncover this
structure. I will base my references on two English translations of the text.
One of these translations, by Afkham Darbandi and Dick Davis, is based on
the edition of Attar’sManteq at-Tair prepared by Sadegh Gouharin in 1978.
The other translation is by C.S. Nott and it is prepared from Garcin de
Tassy’s nineteenth-century French translation. For a more reliable analysis,
I will use both.
Regarding the method of my analysis, I start out with numerical
elimination of certain conceptions represented by various metaphors that
occur in the text. I focus on the conceptions of God, of man and of universe.
If the metaphor relies on a comparison/contrast on any two of these
concepts, I prefer to group them and include the related metaphor in one of
these specific groups. The numerical information with further details can be
found in Table 1.
Throughout the text, there are 105 references to the above-mentioned
conceptions which are grouped according to the schools their content
falls close to and some of them are in literary forms. The references in the
table consist of similes and metaphors, however, it must be noted that
the content of figurative language is not oblique, but fairly clear. That
is because the use of figurative language is followed by the poet’s
explicitation of how the metaphor relates to the idea behind it. With this
aspect of the work, it becomes possible for the reader to see how well-
placed our listing is.
Given the figures in the table, there are fifty-six references in the text that
point out pantheistic conceptions of God and the universe, and this claim
must be accounted for. For the sake of keeping in focus, I will discuss the
overall narrative in detail and support my inferences from it with other
quotations from the text itself. Let us first briefly introduce the overall
narrative.
The Conference of the Birds is the story of birds who wish to find their
king. After the invocation part, the narrative starts with the hoopoe, the
bird that is chosen to lead the others, telling the birds who their king is and
what sort of perilous journey they must take if they truly seek him. Some
birds find the journey too hard and they tell their leader, the hoopoe, their
excuses. The hoopoe’s answers and other anecdotes are used to express
certain beliefs embedded in the overall narrative, e.g. the excuses by the
birds who give up the journey represent the human flaws that are in conflict
with the requirements of spiritual fulfilment. At the end, only thirty birds
survive, while others either give up or die during the journey, and they get to
the gate of God. There they meet Simourgh, which literally means thirty (si)
36I do not aim for a complete literary examination of the text, nevertheless, my analysis shall
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 EZGI ULUSOY ARANYOSI
birds (mourgh), and they come to know that Simourgh is actually they
themselves.
The end of the story is where the figurative language is demonstrated in
one of its strongest uses. When the birds meet God, He answers: ‘(. . .)
Though you traversed the Valleys’ depths and fought/With all the dangers
that the journey brought/The journey was in Me, the deeds were Mine – /
You slept secure in Being’s inmost shrine (. . .)’.41 In addition to the fact that
God is represented as a mirror to whoever could attain the highest stage of
mental pilgrimage, God42 is vocalised to express the identity between the
birds themselves, their deeds and Him. The fact that the journey of
pilgrimage is in Him gives a sense of ontological inclusion, that is, the birds,
their deeds and their journey is not apart from God Himself. Their existence
is included in God’s and there remains the identity between thirty birds and
Simourgh.
The very next anecdote, after the revelation of the identity between
the thirty birds and Simourgh, is about Hallaj,43 and this is more than
a coincidence. His words ‘En el Haqq [I am the Truth]’ have been
controversial in Sufi tradition and at the time, Hallaj was executed for
saying that. Then Attar, when concluding his narrative, recites Hallaj in a
way that he supports Simourgh’s being indeed thirty birds. Hallaj’s
attitude is described by him as a prelude, which may suggest that Hallaj
was not completely unjustified in saying ‘I am the Truth’. When we go back
in the text, there are other places where we face some bits that contain
descriptive statements of God and the universe. As Attar puts it in the
invocation:
God is all, and things have only a nominal value; the world visible and the
world invisible are only Himself. (. . .) There is none but Him. (. . .) No other
than thou [God] is manifested. (. . .) All see themselves in thee and they see
thee in everything. (. . .) To each atom there is a different door, and for each
atom there is a different way which leads to the mysterious Being of whom I
speak.44
41Davis (1984) 220.
42Here, from a literary analysis point of view, we could argue that this voice heard by the
thirty birds when they reached the highest state of spiritual pilgrimage is not necessarily
God’s. This may well be interpreted as their inner voice, as ‘They ask (but inwardly, they
make no sound)’ how come that they are one with Simourgh, and the Lord replies, again,
silently. The way Attar emphasises that this conversation occurs in great silence leads us to
this interpretation.
43Al-Hallaj was a Persian poet, with ties to Sufi doctrine, who was executed for, among other
things, crying out ‘I am the Truth’ while in a state of religious exaltation; see Davis (1984) 220.
The word ‘Truth’ here can also be read as ‘God’, as the Arabic word haqq has two lexical
meanings; see Davis (1984) 13.
44C.S. Nott, The Conference of the Birds – A Sufi Fable by Farid ud-Din Attar (Berkeley:
Shambala, 1971) 4.
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In this passage, there are clues to Attar’s ontological assumptions.
To start with the two worlds, the visible and the invisible,45 the distinction
between ‘all’ and ‘all to senses’ comes in. The world visible consists of
material things, things that are of nominal value. The adjective ‘visible’ may
have been chosen for a couple of reasons: (1) Visibility refers to the sense of
sight, which is one of the dominant senses in perception of the environment
around us. Hence, the world visible is understood as by its very definition
involving the existence of human observers and it is intended to reflect the
limitation of their knowledge as compared to divine knowledge. (2) The
visible also brings in ‘the invisible’. To state a clear epistemic distinction
between what is known to us (what is available to our sense-perception) and
what is not known to us (what is not available to our sense-perception), the
visible–invisible pair seems to fit in firmly regarding Attar’s metaphorical
use.46 The world visible and the world invisible are distinct in this sense,
however, it is stated that they – together – are only Himself and there is
nothing but Him. There is no denial of God’s existence including the world
visible, there is only more to it and that is the world invisible. There appears
a duality for us, then, the duality between the visible world47 and the
invisible world. This distinction for us arises from the limits of our under-
standing. On the other hand, when we speak of God, we speak of a unity of
these two worlds48 as Him, which is, in itself, available not to our knowl-
edge49 but to God’s. In His case, there is no duality due to any limitation of
knowledge. All-to-God is the mere instantiation of the essential unity of
existence as a whole, whereas all-to-us necessarily brings about the duality
between the two worlds. In other words, from where we stand, we see the
whole existence through this duality; from God’s perspective, however, such
a duality no longer remains there, for He is the Knower of all things. Given
45The reference to the world seen, namely the visible, and the world unseen, namely the
invisible, occurs a number of times in the narrative. One of these places is when a man cries for
his son’s death, saying that he did not see enough of the world. He is replied in the text with the
lines, ‘If you would take the world with you, you must/Descend with all the world unseen to
dust’. Another point is when a fool of God says ‘The world, as far as I can see/Is like a box, and
we are locked inside’. Both of these uses of the world seen (in the first case, the world that we
live in) and the world unseen (in the second case, our limits in this world are emphasised with
the box simile, hence the world unseen consists of what is out of the box) are in the same line of
emphasis with what is going on in the quoted passage.
46The point here is that Attar uses ‘the sensible’ as a metaphorical reference to the ‘the
knowable’, without claiming that ‘the sensible’ can be identifiable with ‘the knowable’.
47The world visible, I shall call from this point on all-to-us, for it refers to what is available to
our sense-perception.
48The world visible and the world invisible, I shall call from this point on all-to-God, for they
refer to more than what is available to our sense-perception, that is the spiritual content of the
creation. Only God, Knower of all things, have knowledge of all things from different degrees of
existence.
49‘God is above and beyond evidence, and nothing can give any idea of his Holy Majesty’ with
Attar’s words; see Nott (1971) p. 4.
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this difference in scopes of knowability,50 then, duality in unity seems an
option to be considered in metaphysical terms of Sufism. At this point, the
question is how to fit these two essentially different notions into one system.
Before I get to this question towards the end of the project, I will discuss
Spinozistic conceptions of God and of the universe depending on textual
evidence from his work Ethics. Discussing Spinoza will help me elaborate on
certain pantheistic tendencies in his philosophy and relating some of
his ideas to my discussion of a plausible pantheistic scheme for Sufi
metaphysics.
4. SPINOZA’S GOD – THE DIVINE MIND AND REFLECTIONS
ON SIMOURGH
Spinoza’s philosophy has been interpreted in various ways by philoso-
phers so far. Some of these interpretations radically differ from each
other regarding the issue of whether Spinozistic substance monism entails
some kind of pantheism. As a result of this divergence in analysis,
Spinoza has been labelled a pantheist,51 an atheist,52 a panentheist53 and
none of these54 at times. In this part of the project, even though it is an
50The following remark of Chittick’s (1994, 16) calls for a closer look at the issue: ‘It would be a
great error to suppose –as some short-sighted critics have supposed – that he simply affirms the
oneness of wujud while ascribing the manyness of the cosmos to illusion or human ignorance.’
Here we must stress that our picture on the two different scopes of knowability consists not of
ontic but of epistemic assumptions. All-to-us is in no case intended to have any implications
about the ontic status of the manyness in the physical world, which is ‘almost’ as real as unity
according to Chittick’s interpretation of Ibn al-’Arabi. Our distinction does not aim to attempt
to solve the problem of duality in unity by ascribing different ontic status to them, it rather tries
to do so by examining their epistemic standing that may be giving rise to conceptions such as
duality or unity.
51Throughout the eighteenth century, German thought that connects to the nineteenth century
Romanticism, the admiration of Spinozism was quite common. Goethe (Genevieve Lloyd,
Spinoza and the Ethics (London: Routledge, 1996) 15), Lessing (Jacobi, [1785] (1994) 181) and
Hegel (Hegel, G.W.F. [1840]. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, translated by R. S. Haldane
and Frances H. Simson (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul – New York: The Humanities Press,
1974, 281–2) are some thinkers who took Spinoza to be a pantheist. Among contemporary
philosophers, Jonathan Bennett recognises Spinoza as a pantheist as well; see his ‘Spinoza’s
Monism: A Reply to Curley’, in God and Nature: Spinoza’s Metaphysics, edited by Yirmiyahu
Yovel (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991) 58.
52For example, Pierre Bayle in his famousHistorical and Critical Dictionary depicted Spinoza as
an atheist; see Lloyd (1996) 11.
53Genevieve Lloyd embraces Martial Guéroult’s suggestion that ‘panentheism’ fits better than
‘pantheism’ to Spinoza’s view of the relation between God and the world; see Lloyd, ibid., 40.
54For example, Edwin Curley says that he does not call Spinoza a ‘pantheist’ in his book
Spinoza’s Metaphysics; see Edwin Curley, ‘On Bennett’s interpretation of Spinoza’s monism’, in
God and Nature: Spinoza’s Metaphysics, edited by Yirmiyahu Yovel (Leiden: Brill, 1991) 45.
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attempt that requires more space than I am permitted to have here, I will
argue that Spinoza is a pantheist. Those who have rejected this label for
Spinoza so far argued that the Spinozistic conception of God refers to
more than the material world; therefore; the case for Spinoza’s philo-
sophy is not pantheism but panentheism. I agree with this assumption of
theirs, but nevertheless I will go further to conclude otherwise. I will
argue that there is at least one case in which panentheism coincides with
pantheism: the case in which God is a single infinite mind55 that both
contains the attributes of thought and of extension and at the same time
consists of these attributes. This argumentation will relate to the first two
parts of the project in the following way: if there is at least one case in
which panentheism coincides with pantheism, then this enables us to
consider all-to-us and all-to-God, therefore, the duality in unity in The
Conference of the Birds, as possible. Hence, our claim of Sufi metaphysics
being not only what Islamic philosophers so far offered us will become
justified by this analysis.
Neither doing exegetical work on Spinoza’s Ethics nor saying something
more than mere exegesis is an easy task. Scholars who attempt to analyse the
Ethics are likely to face one evident difficulty: the structure of the text as
‘Demonstrated in geometrical order’. Parkinson says this form makes
Spinoza’s argument seem needlessly long-winded and obscures the nature of
his thought.56 Another possible consequence, I believe, is that this form
allows the reader to focus on the parts as well as on the whole work in its
entirety, as the connections and relevant bits are pointed in the text itself
precisely by its form. The reader is enabled and even guided by the text to
perform partial analysis on the desired subject by tracing back the references
to related axioms, definitions, propositions, scholia, etc. This is going to be
our method throughout the discussion of Spinozistic conception of God and
of God’s relation to the rest.
To be able to discuss whether Spinoza was a pantheist or not, we must
look at what Spinoza himself has to say about the one basic concept that
demarcates the characteristics of any theistic doctrine: God.
By God I understand an absolutely infinite entity, that is, a substance
consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite
substance. (E1D6)57
55Keith Ward in his latest book, Pascal’s Fire (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006) argues for
God as a single infinite mind; however, while his argumentation focuses on the new ways of
thinking that seem to be made possible by quantum theory, I will base my version on Spinozistic
ideas on God and on the conceptual analysis of how panentheism may ever overlap with
pantheism.
56Parkinson (2000) 5.
57Abbreviations used for Spinoza’s Ethics are the following: E¼Ethics, D¼Definition,
P¼Proposition and S¼Scholium.
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To see what he means by some elements of this definition, we need to
check the definitions of ‘attribute’ and of ‘substance’:
By attribute I understand that which intellect perceives of substance, as
constituting its essence. (E1D4)
By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through
itself; that is, that which does not need the concept of another thing, from
which concept it must be formed. (E1D3)
These definitions form the basic aspects of the Spinozistic conception of
God, such as its absolute infinity, its independent existence, its existing as
one and the only substance and its being expressed by infinite number of
attributes. In this picture, so far, God exists alone as a substance that consists
of attributes, and these attributes are what is perceived of the substance by the
intellect. Substance’s priority to its affections, there being only one substance,
substance’s being a causa sui, infinity of substance, necessity of substance, unity
of substance are demonstrated by the propositions 1, 2–5, 6–7, 8, 11 and 13,
respectively. It is possible to list other complementary propositions, corollaries
and scholia to support these characteristics of the Spinozistic conception of
God. Since this kind of analysis would chain us to a merely exegetical
endeavour, let us focus on what in Spinoza’s Ethics could lead us to portray
God as a single infinite mind.58
The first occurrence of Spinoza’s referring to God as a thinking thing is
the second corollary to proposition 14, which only mentions thought and
extension either as attributes of God or as affections of the attributes of
God. Some parts of the scholium to proposition 17, however, say a bit more:
(. . .) the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived as constituting the essence of
God, is truly the cause of things – both of their essence and of their existence.
This seems to have been noted by those [e.g. Descartes]59 who have asserted
that God’s intellect, will and power are one and the same. So the intellect of God
is the unique cause of things – namely, as we have shown, both of their essence
and of their existence – (. . .). (E1P17S; my emphasis)
In this quotation, Spinoza makes his point by appeal to Descartes’ idea
that God’s intellect, will and power are one and the same. He takes this
claim a bit further than that by putting forward an extent: in so far as it (the
58The reading we will present here could be considered a far cry from the mainstream
interpretations of Spinoza. Therefore, this reading is by no means asserted as the right
interpretation of Spinozistic philosophy. It rather reflects upon several aspects of Spinozistic
thought and remains open to debate, naturally.
59This example is given by Parkinson as a footnote to the original text as the following: ‘See e.g.
Descartes, Principles, I, 23: PWD i. 20I, and Spinoza’s geometrical version of the work,
PPCIP17C.’ (Parkinson 2000, 327)
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intellect of God) is conceived as constituting the essence of God. Then, he
concludes that the intellect of God is the unique cause of things, both of
their essence and of their existence. Besides the immanent (E1P18) causal
relation of God to things, the extent to which God’s intellect is conceived as
constituting the essence of God reveals an identification between God’s
intellect and God’s essence.60 Proposition 20 adds to this identity: ‘God’s
existence and his essence are one and the same’ (E1P20). Taking these into
account, we can form the following argument:
(1) God’s intellect constitutes the essence of God. (in E1P17S)61
(2) The essence of God and the existence of God are one and the same.
(E1P20)
(3) God’s intellect constitutes the existence of God. (1, 2)
(4) God exists as one and the only substance that consists of infinite
attributes. (E1P14)
(5) God’s intellect constitutes one and the only substance that consists of
infinite attributes. (3, 4)
(6) God’s intellect constitutes infinite attributes of the substance. (5,
transitivity of identity)
Therefore, God’s intellect constitutes God. (6, 4)
The conclusion of the argument above can equally be expressed in terms
of identity.62 When constitution as an expression of the identity between the
60Here. some can argue that X being constituted by Y does not entail that X is identical to Y;
however, this seems to be a problem of naming rather than pointing to an invalid shift from
‘constitution’ to ‘identity’. An object Z consisting of atomic particles, say a pen, is still simply
called a pen instead of ‘object Z – the material entity that is constituted by a number of atomic
particles at region R at time T’, and with even more technical specifications. Hence, in our case,
God’s intellect that constitutes the essence of God is identical to the essence of God in such a
way. Another example could be a ‘collection’ of books. The total of books constitute a
collection and in fact, the total of the books is identical to the collection itself. Here, the relation
is not interdependence, so to say, but identity; since the product of constitution equals to the
constituter in its totality.
61One may object that (E1P17S) is not by itself making a claim as such; however, we must
emphasise here that the claim ‘God’s intellect constitutes the essence of God’ is put forward as a
condition/premise for the main proposition, ‘God alone is a free cause’, to work properly.
Hence, the use of this premise as a part of Spinozistic thought seems quite legitimate. Another
objection may arise by taking what Spinoza says in the same scholium just before ‘For the
intellect and will which constitute the essence of God would have to differ entirely from our
intellect and will, and they could agree with them only in name (no more, in fact than the Dog,
the heavenly constellation, agrees with the dog, the animal that barks.)’. Our attempt to regard
God as a single infinite mind, as this objection suggests, does not fit with what is said here.
However, these words of Spinoza’s could be read as merely stating the difference in degree
between God’s intellect and human intellect. While God’s intellect is truly the cause of things,
human intellect lacks that kind of potency. Since the extent to which we call God’s intellect a
mind does not seem to conflict with this difference in degree, naming God’s intellect as a single
infinite mind is not an issue concerning such an objection.
62See footnote 55.
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constituter and the constituted applies to this conclusion, it results in the
following: God’s intellect is identical to God. God, then, is an infinite
mind.63
Having argued for God as a single infinite mind, which – as an idea –
grows out of a Spinozistic root, against other alternatives; now, we shall
turn to how this conception of the divine mind reveals the way pantheism
and panentheism coincide, and how this framework brings a new alternative
to Sufi metaphysics by translating the metaphysical connotations in The
Conference of the Birds into a philosophical system.
The picture we have drawn so far reflects God as a single infinite mind – in
other words, as constituted by His intellect – that consists of an infinite
number of attributes – and we rely on Spinozistic terms to reach this
conclusion. In this section, our first objective is to show how the idea that
God is a single infinite mind exhibits a pantheistic character in this way. Our
second objective is to apply the idea of duality in unity, which we defined
when discussing the metaphysical connotations of The Conference of the
Birds, to this pantheistic scheme and, therefore, to suggest a new
explanatory framework for Sufi metaphysics.
If we take God to be a single infinite mind, then it is apparent that we
accept God as a thinking thing. At this point, it becomes crucial to examine
the nature of this act of thinking and the relationship between the Thinker
and the thought. In particular, we shall aim to reveal the difference in
perspective between the scopes of these acts of thinking that are attributed
to the human ‘I’ and the divine ‘I’ respectively. Let us first take into account
a formulation that expresses the human thinking, ‘I think (I am a thinking
thing)’.64 From this, we shift to the object65 of thinking, which is expressed
as the following: ‘Then, there is the thought that I think’. Now, all this
formulation says is that there is thinking that is ascribed to the subject ‘I’.
Before arriving at a more general conclusion, let us run this formulation for
the case of divine thinking as well: ‘I [God] think (God is a thinking thing).’,
followed by ‘Then there is the thought that I [God] think.’ for the sake of the
shift to the object of thinking. Again, what this formulation emphasises is
that there is the act of thinking by the subject that the formulation is uttered
by.
The results of such formulations could be run at two levels: (A) At the
ontic level: If all that is revealed is the existence of thinking, then we can
renounce the subject/predicate duality and commit ourselves to a
63Even though he gives us neither textual evidence nor any arguments, John Leslie thinks that
according to Spinoza, divine thinking is the only reality and our intricately structured universe
is an intricate pattern in a divine mind. See Leslie, Immortality Defended (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2007) 36.
64This formulation is inspired by Descartes’ cogito; however, it has an essentially different
claim – as mentioned above – than the Cartesian purpose, namely, proving the indubitable
existence of the ‘I’.
65Here, the term ‘object’ is used as a primitive notion.
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naturalistic position: there is only thinking for granted.66 According to this
view, the duality between the subject and the predicate vanishes, that is,
thinking is the one and the same thing as the subject. As the act of thinking
is what grounds the alleged subject to exist in the first place, the naturalist
finds no sense to appeal to the existence of a subject as such, and instead
takes thinking to be the existent itself. (B) At the epistemic level, the
thinking/thought structure persists. This is the panentheistic aspect of the
idea of God as a single infinite mind.
Our main claim ‘God’s intellect constitutes God’ reveals a similar type of
identity to the one we see in the conclusion (A) that we have drawn above,
namely, that of the thinker and the thinking being one and the same thing. If
the Thinker (in the divine case) and the thinking is the same, and if the
divine thought-patterns that express God’s essence (in Spinozistic terms
infinite attributes of the substance that are constituted by God’s intellect)
then all there is is the divine thinking with infinitely many thought-
patterns.67 The uniformity of these thought-patterns as ontologically
dependent on one and the only divine thinking, hence, is the whole of
existence, (A), and all is both one and in one, as the thought-patterns are
both constituting the divine thinking and expressed within the divine
thinking, (B). God as a single infinite mind, therefore, is a pantheistic system
that subsumes a panentheistic assumption.
Now, let us relate this scheme to the idea of duality in unity that is
extracted from The Conference of the Birds. The idea of duality in unity as
an outcome of the distinction between all-to-us and all-to-God, of which
there are reflections in Attar’s use of metaphors throughout the text, springs
from the different scopes of knowability. If God as the divine thinking
contemplates an infinite number of things, then all-to-God is the thought-
patterns of this infinite contemplation. God’s thought patterns, in other
words, are the world visible and the world invisible, if put in Attarian terms.
From God’s perspective, as it were, the unity of existence (of the worlds
visible and invisible) is provided through His very thinking serving as the
substrate for infinite number of divine thought patterns. All-to-us, as what
we have direct knowledge of, on the contrary, are the things which we, by
the limits of understanding, cannot contemplate. The duality for human
understanding is apparent at this point, whereas there is only unity in the
case of God’s infinite contemplation, because God’s thinking as the centre
of the infinite thought-patterns unifies all. God’s existence as a single infinite
mind, then, resolves the seeming tension of ‘the duality in unity’, since it
66This idea was brought up by Georg Lichtenberg as an objection to Descartes’ cogito, which
says that the most that Descartes could claim was ‘cogitatur’, ‘there is some thinking going on’;
see Bernard Williams, Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin Books, 1978)
95).
67This does not mean that there is only the attribute of thought. This idea rather conjoins the
attribute of thought, the mental, and the attribute of extension, the physical, on the basis of the
divine mind that infinitely parallels these realms, if rightly put, of these two main attributes.
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shows that the duality in unity is epistemic rather than ontic. While the
scope of human knowledge provides an understanding of God in a binary
opposition as God and God’s thinking at the epistemic level; at the ontic
level, there exists one divine mind that is God’s thinking, and the knowl-
edge of this existence is only available to God himself through his very
thinking.
5. CONCLUSION
In this article, I started out by facing the phenomenon that when the
literary texts, which have an undeniable potential to reveal the philo-
sophical aspects of Sufism, are examined in a way in which an underlying
philosophical system can be extracted from them, we see that there are
views that do not completely match the traditional viewpoint. In my case,
this traditional viewpoint was associated with Ibn al-’Arabi’s and our
literary text to examine was The Conference of the Birds by Farid ud-Din
Attar. My project aimed to work out a sample case (Attar’s) and suggest a
way of understanding the metaphysical assumptions behind that particular
Sufi text. These metaphysical assumptions in Attar’s piece seem to
systematically match certain pantheistic principles that are in conflict with
the traditional viewpoint. The attempt of this article was to cast light on
these formal similarities between our interpretation of Attar’s text
concerning its metaphysical connotations and some elements of the
Spinozistic thought. Attar’s formulation of the duality in unity and of the
totality of the visible and the invisible worlds led me to examine how
these assumptions can philosophically survive. After introducing our
reading of Spinozistic God as a divine mind, which ontologically includes
and consists of an infinite number of thoughts, on the substrate of Spi-
nozistic ideas, I came to relate Attar’s Sufi metaphysical assumptions to
certain aspects of this reading, in a way in which God’s being a single
infinite mind captures the Attarian ideas such as ‘the duality in unity’.
Finally, I suggested that when the metaphysical connotations of The
Conference of the Birds are examined in the light of the pantheistic
framework suggested earlier, it is seen that reading a Sufi literary text
with an interpretation that reflects upon different metaphysical assump-
tions is plausible. This possibility of there being a different metaphysical
reading of at least one Sufi text leads us to think that the traditional
approach is not the only recipe for understanding Sufi metaphysics
and that the generalisations on Sufi metaphysics are not justified. Sufi
literary texts with their philosophy-laden nature await exploration for
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